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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 We here confront an issue of first impression: whether 
the Government, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Sell, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), can have a 
sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a 
defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit 
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to proceed with sentencing.  Under the facts presented in this 
case, we answer that question in the affirmative and we will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 Cruz was arrested in August of 2011 and indicted on 
one count of assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) employees, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 111 (“Count I”), and two counts of threatening a federal law 
enforcement officer, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115 
(respectively, “Count II” and “Count III”).  The District Court 
granted Cruz a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury 
returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III. 
 
 In August of 2012, after the District Court received but 
before Cruz could raise objections to the pre-sentence 
investigation report (“PSR”), the Government raised concern 
about and moved for a determination of Cruz’s competency.1  
Its motion was granted, and Cruz was evaluated by Dr. 
William J. Ryan, a forensic psychologist working for the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).  Dr. Ryan, as reflected in 
a report submitted to the District Court, concluded that Cruz 
was mentally incompetent because he suffered from 
                                                 
1 The Government sought a competency determination 
at this stage of the proceedings because “Franklin County 
prison officials [had] complained about Cruz’s behavior.”  
(App. 69.) 
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schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type.  Upon receipt of Dr. 
Ryan’s report, the District Court scheduled a competency 
hearing.  Following that hearing, it concluded that Cruz was 
mentally incompetent and found that he could not proceed 
with sentencing. 
 
 The District Court received a second competency 
evaluation and report from the BOP in May of 2013, which 
was co-authored by forensic psychologist Angela Weaver and 
BOP staff psychologist Robert Lucking.  Drs. Weaver and 
Lucking concurred with Dr. Ryan’s diagnosis, noted Cruz’s 
ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication 
recommended by BOP personnel, and concluded that without 
such medication Cruz would remain mentally incompetent.  
They also concluded that “there is a substantial probability 
that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced 
medication.  (App. 70.)  The Weaver/Lucking report included 
a proposed treatment plan and a request that the Government 
seek a court order under Sell, authorizing the BOP to 
medicate Cruz involuntarily. 
 
B. 
 
 The Government filed a motion on May 29, 2013, 
seeking an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz 
against his will.  (See App. 68-142.)  The papers filed by the 
Government included, inter alia, its “Omnibus Motion and 
Brief,” related exhibits, and, pursuant to the District Court’s 
local rules, a certificate indicating that Cruz’s lawyer was 
contacted and expressed Cruz’s non-concurrence in the 
motion.  The Omnibus Motion and Brief made clear that the 
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Government sought two forms of relief: first, a hearing 
pursuant to Sell; and second, following the hearing, a court 
order authorizing forced medication. 
 
 The District Court promptly scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing, which was continued three times (twice at Cruz’s 
request) and ultimately held on October 22, 2013.  In the 
intervening five months—i.e., the period following the May 
29, 2013 filing of the motion and preceding the October 22, 
2013 hearing—Cruz failed to file a petition, motion, brief, or 
other document indicating that he opposed the Government’s 
ultimate request for relief. 
  
 The District Court began the October 22, 2013 hearing 
by informing the parties that it was “held pursuant to the 
Supreme Court decision in Sell v. United States” and 
providing “the Sell criteria sort of as a backdrop to the 
testimony” that would be presented.  (App. 145, 147.)  It 
reminded the parties that “involuntary medication of 
nondangerous individuals should only occur when four 
conditions are satisfied” and recited those factors for their 
benefit: 
 
 First, the court must find that important 
governmental interests are at stake.  Second, the 
court must conclude that involuntary 
medication will significantly further those 
interests, and this second factor includes 
determining that medication is substantially 
likely to render the defendant competent and 
that the treatment is unlikely to have side effects 
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that impair the defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel. 
 Third, the court must determine that 
involuntary medication is necessary to further 
those interests because alternative[,] less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve the 
same results.  And fourth, the court must find 
that involuntary medication is medically 
appropriate, or, in other words, in the patient’s 
medical interests in light of his medical 
condition. 
 The first factor, whether the government 
has advanced sufficiently important interests to 
justify forcible medication, is a question of law, 
and the remaining three factors are factual 
questions which the government must prove 
with clear and convincing evidence . . . . 
 So in light of those factors and that 
background, . . . I’ll turn to the government and 
ask . . . if [it] would like to present testimonial 
evidence in support of [its] motion. 
 
(App. 147-49.) 
 
 Drs. Weaver and Lucking testified for the 
Government, which introduced, among other documents, both 
the PSR and the May 2013 Weaver/Lucking report.  Cruz, 
who was represented by the Federal Public Defender, did not 
object to the introduction of either of those documents.  
However, he noted through counsel that he “didn’t 
necessarily agree with that guideline range.”  (App. 229.)  
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Shortly thereafter, again acting through counsel, he declined 
the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing and stated 
that he “[did not] have any argument at [that] juncture.”  
(App. 230.) 
 
 The District Court took the matter under advisement 
and two days later entered the order that is at issue on appeal.  
As there illustrated, the District Court considered the 
circumstances of Cruz’s case and concluded that all four of 
the Sell criteria were satisfied.  Its analysis of the first 
criterion, which is central to this appeal, rested on two legs. 
 
 First, the District Court concluded that a sufficiently 
important government interest was at stake because 
“[r]endering a defendant competent for sentencing enables 
not only the government, but also the court and the defendant 
himself, to ensure that the defendant receives a sentence that 
accurately reflects the nature of his offense and his individual 
circumstances.”  (App. 7 (citing United States v. Wood, 459 
F. Supp. 2d 451, 457-60 (E.D. Va. 2006)).)  It further 
explained: 
 
 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third 
Circuit ha[s] promulgated a test to determine 
the seriousness of a crime, but other circuits 
have looked to the statutory maximum 
mandated for the offense or the applicable  
guidelines range.  The Third Circuit in [United 
States v. ]Grape[, 549 F.3d 591, 600 (3d Cir. 
2008),] determined that under either rubric, the 
defendant was accused of “serious” crimes 
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because the crimes had statutory mandatory 
minimums of 10 and 15 years and the defendant 
had a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months[’] 
imprisonment. 
 In the case sub judice, the draft pre-
sentence investigation report provisionally 
identifies a 10-year statutory maximum for each 
count and a guidelines range of 100 to 125 
months[’] imprisonment.  Certainly, pursuant to 
the criteria set forth in Grape, Cruz was 
convicted of “serious” crimes and the 
government possesses a strong interest in 
rendering him competent for sentencing. 
 
(App. 7-8 (citations omitted).)2 
 
 Second, the District Court found that no special 
circumstances lessened the importance of the Government’s 
interest.  It noted that Sell identified two examples of such 
special circumstances: “(1) when the defendant has already 
been incarcerated for a significant period of time; or (2) 
whether there is a possibility of future civil commitment.”  
(App. 8.)  But it concluded that neither of those circumstances 
were present here. 
                                                 
2 The District Court was “mindful . . . that neither 
party . . . had the opportunity to lodge objections to the pre-
sentence investigation report’s findings” and noted that it had 
not “yet . . . consider[ed] the many circumstances that may 
contribute to Cruz’s ultimate sentence.”  (App. 5 n.1.) 
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 With respect to the length of Cruz’s incarceration, the 
court concluded that he had not been incarcerated for a 
significant amount of time.  It cited and discussed Grape, 
where this Court noted that the defendant had been 
incarcerated for approximately three and half years but 
“reasoned that in light of [his] potential sentence, he would 
still need to serve a majority of his sentence if convicted.”  
(Id. (citing Grape, 549 F.3d at 602).)  The Grape court 
concluded as a matter of law that that defendant had not been 
incarcerated for a significant amount of time.  By analogy, the 
District Court reached the same conclusion here.  It reasoned 
that Cruz, who had been incarcerated for only two years, 
might still need to serve the majority of his sentence.  When 
reaching that conclusion, the District Court relied principally 
upon the PSR, which “provisionally identifie[d] a 10-year 
statutory maximum for each count and a guidelines range of 
100 to 125 months[’] imprisonment.”  (Id.) 
 
 With respect to the possibility of future civil 
confinement, the District Court examined the statutes that 
might authorize such confinement, 18 U.S.C. § 4246 and 50 
Pa.C.S. § 7301, and noted each statute’s prerequisites to civil 
confinement.  Importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 4246 required “a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 
damage to property of another” while 50 Pa.C.S. § 7301 
required a showing of “clear and present danger or harm to 
others or to himself.”  In light of those prerequisites, the 
District Court made note of record evidence that called into 
question the likelihood that Cruz could be civilly committed.  
Although “the [PSR] indicate[d] that Cruz has a lengthy 
criminal history involving numerous acts of violence and 
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threats of violence,” and although “[e]ntries from the [BOP]’s 
Psychology Data System . . . indicat[ed] that Cruz ha[d] 
continued to threaten violence against others,” “[t]he May 
2013 evaluation explicitly state[d] that Cruz ha[d] not posed a 
threat to himself or others . . . and does not pose a risk of 
committing serious harm to others.”  (App. 9-10.)  The 
District Court characterized the conflict in the record as 
“[u]ncertainty surrounding the” likelihood that “Cruz [could] 
be civilly committed” in the future and concluded that such 
uncertainty did “not materially diminish” and “clearly [did] 
not undermine” the Government’s interest in restoring Cruz’s 
mental competency to render him fit to proceed with 
sentencing.  (App. 10.) 
 
C. 
 
 Cruz moved for a stay of the District Court’s order on 
October 29, 2013.  In the brief filed in support of that motion 
(“Stay Brief”), he conceded that “the government has an 
interest in sentencing a convicted defendant.”  (Supplemental 
App. 9.)  However, he argued that the District Court erred in 
finding that special circumstances did not lessen the 
importance of the Government’s interest. 
 
 Cruz first argued that the District Court erred when it 
concluded that he had not been incarcerated for a significant 
amount of time.  He disagreed with the District Court’s 
reliance on the PSR, and he argued that such reliance was 
inappropriate because he had not yet had an opportunity to 
object to the Guidelines, argue for relevant departures, or 
raise other considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
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Specifically, he argued that it was unclear whether he needed 
to serve a majority of his sentence.  (Supplemental App. 6.) 
 
 He also argued, with specific reference to both 18 
U.S.C. § 4246 and 50 Pa.C.S. § 7301, that “it is quite possible 
that [he] could be civilly committed in the future.”  (Id.)  He 
failed, however, to flesh out that argument by either 
developing it further or citing relevant legal sources. 
 
 The Government did not oppose Cruz’s stay motion, 
which the District Court granted.  Thereafter, Cruz filed this 
appeal. 
 
II. 
 
 We pause here to restate the arguments that Cruz 
presents on appeal and to draw a roadmap for our analysis.  
Cruz argues that the District Court erred when it authorized 
the BOP to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication 
because the first Sell criterion, which concerns the importance 
of the Government’s interest in restoring his competency, was 
not adequately established.  He raises five arguments that 
bear on that issue. 
 
 First, he argues that the Government’s interest in 
restoring his competency is less than that shown in other 
cases (e.g., Grape and Sell) because, here, the Government 
merely seeks to restore his mental competency for sentencing.  
He thus seeks to distinguish his case from the vast majority of 
cases under Sell, where the Government seeks to restore a 
defendant’s competency before trial has begun.  He then 
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argues that the Government lacks an important interest here 
because the crimes at issue, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115, are 
less serious than the crimes that were at issue in Grape and 
Sell. 
 
 Cruz next raises arguments that concern the District 
Court’s reference to and, in some sense, reliance on the PSR.  
He contends that such reliance was misplaced because he had 
not yet had an opportunity to object to the Guidelines range 
calculated in the PSR, which was based on a career-offender 
enhancement.  He also finds fault with the District Court for 
relying on the PSR because it does not take into account his 
mental health status, which could serve as a basis for either a 
downward departure or variance. 
 
 Finally, he states that it is very likely that he will be 
civilly committed to a suitable facility for care and treatment 
and that such likelihood constitutes a special circumstance 
that undermines the Government’s interest. 
 
 The Government responds that Cruz failed to raise 
these issues before the District Court and urges us to review 
those issues only for plain error.  Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).  
It also asserts that no error was committed, plain or otherwise, 
in the Sell proceedings before the District Court. 
 
 Our discussion will begin with the threshold inquiry 
raised by the Government: the appropriateness of plain error 
review.  We thereafter turn our attention to the Sell-specific 
standard of review, which we have not had cause to examine 
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since our 2008 decision in Grape.  Finally, we will examine 
the merits of each of Cruz’s arguments. 3 
 
III. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 because Cruz was charged with violations of federal 
law.  It is well-settled that we have jurisdiction under the 
collateral order exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See, e.g., 
Grape, 549 F.3d at 597. 
 
IV. 
 
 Cruz disputes the Government’s invocation of plain 
error review on three grounds.  First, he argues that plain 
error review cannot rise here under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b) because the appeal does not concern a purely 
“criminal” issue.  Second, he argues that the Government’s 
invocation of plan error review “overlooks significant factual 
                                                 
3 Ordinarily, we would determine as a threshold matter 
whether our analysis is better couched under Sell or, 
alternatively, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).  
See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 738 F.3d 284, 290 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013).  Here, the District Court received psychological 
evaluations that rendered Harper inapplicable because they 
demonstrated that Cruz was not a danger to himself or others.  
Those evaluations accorded with the Government’s position 
before the District Court and similarly accord with its position 
on appeal.  Thus, we will proceed under Sell without further 
discussion. 
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and procedural aspects of this case that belie the application 
of such a standard.”  (Reply Br. at 3.)  Finally, he contends 
that the arguments at issue raised on appeal were preserved in 
the Stay Brief. 
 
 Upon full consideration of Cruz’s arguments, we have 
concluded that they have little merit.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will review this appeal only for plain error. 
 
A. 
 
 Cruz first argues against the Government’s invocation 
of plain error review because the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure neither explicitly recognize nor provide a 
framework for objections in Sell proceedings.  He thus 
distinguishes the instant appeal from an appeal from, for 
example, denial of traditional post-trial motions.  He also 
argues that the absence of such framework precludes the 
forfeiture of arguments that he could have raised but did not 
raise in the District Court’s Sell proceedings. 
 
 Cruz’s arguments invite consideration of traditional 
notions of issue preservation, forfeiture, and waiver.  
Forfeiture, of course, is not exactly the same as waiver; rights 
may be forfeited without being waived.  See Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  The distinction between those 
terms is particularly important in criminal appeals.  We will 
review issues and arguments that were forfeited before the 
District Court but, as a general rule, we will not examine 
those that were knowingly and intelligently waived.  See, e.g., 
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Gov’t of the V.I. v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“‘[W]here there was forfeiture, we apply a plain error 
analysis; where there was waiver, we do not.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
 The Supreme Court considered the differences 
between forfeiture and waiver in United States v. Olano.  
There, in the context of a criminal appeal, the Court rejected 
the bright-line application of waiver doctrines to an issue that 
was merely forfeited during trial and presented for the first 
time on appeal.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
732-34 (1993).  It noted that “[a] rigid and undeviating 
judicially declared practice under which courts of review 
would invariably and under all circumstances decline to 
consider all questions” that were forfeited “would be out of 
harmony with . . . the rules of fundamental justice.”  Id. at 
732 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Although in theory it could be argued that ‘[i]f the question 
was not presented to the trial court no error was committed by 
the trial court [and] hence there is nothing to review,’” the 
Court rejected that theory, noting that it was “not the theory 
that Rule 52(b) adopts.”  Id. at 733 (first alteration in original; 
citation omitted). 
 
 The Supreme Court further explained in Olano that 
plain error includes any “[d]eviation from a legal rule” that is 
not explicitly, knowingly, and intelligently waived (e.g., 
through a guilty plea made pursuant to Rule 11).  See 507 
U.S. at 732-33.  The parties do not assert and the record does 
not support a finding of such waiver here.  Thus, the plain 
language of Rule 52(b) appears to belie Cruz’s argument, as 
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that rule applies to any “plain error that affects substantial 
rights.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 4 
 
 Finally, it is noteworthy that this Court’s review for 
plain error would comport with other courts’ application of 
                                                 
4 We are sensitive to the fact that this appeal concerns 
Cruz’s “substantial rights,” in the colloquial sense.  Indeed, 
we are sensitive to the significant liberty interest at stake: 
Cruz’s interest “in avoiding the unwanted administration of 
antipsychotropic drugs.”  Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.  There are 
“several dimensions” to that liberty, which “are both physical 
and intellectual.  Every violation of a person’s bodily 
integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. . . .  And when 
the purpose or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will 
and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of 
liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.”  Id. at 237-
38 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
also id. (“The liberty of citizens to resist the administration of 
mind altering drugs arises from our Nation’s most basic 
values.”). 
We note, however, that the appeal also concerns 
“substantial rights” in the sense contemplated by Rule 52(b) 
and characterized in Olano as rights that affect the outcome 
of a proceeding.  The order authorizing the BOP to forcibly 
medicate Cruz plainly meets that test.  See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. 
at 176-77 (“By the time of trial [the defendant] will have 
undergone forced medication—the very harm that he seeks to 
avoid.  He cannot undo that harm even if he is acquitted.  
Indeed, if he is acquitted, there will be no appeal through 
which he might obtain review.”). 
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that standard to similar appeals.  See Dillon, 738 F.3d  at 287 
(recognizing forfeiture of argument on the first Sell criterion 
and related “special circumstances,” and reviewing appeal for 
plain error); United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
 
B. 
 
 Cruz next argues that any assertion of forfeiture 
“overlooks significant factual and procedural aspects of this 
case that belie the application of” plain error review.  (Reply 
Br. at 3.)  Specifically, he argues that his appellate arguments 
warrant de novo review because he lacked an opportunity to 
oppose the Government’s motion.  Essentially, his argument 
tracks Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which provides in pertinent part: “If a party does not have an 
opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an 
objection does not later prejudice that party.”  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 51(b). 
 
 We see little merit in this argument.  Review of the 
District Court proceedings plainly demonstrates that Cruz 
enjoyed but failed to avail himself of several opportunities to 
oppose the Government’s motion. 
 
 Cruz initially faults the Government for asserting that 
he failed to respond to its motion.  This aspect of his 
argument has two parts.  First, he cites the Government’s 
certificate of non-concurrence (i.e., the certificate included in 
its motion papers) as evidence of his opposition.  Second, and 
of purportedly “[g]reater significance,” he notes that the 
 
18 
District Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing only six days 
after the Government filed its motion.  Because the District 
Court granted the Government some of the relief that it 
sought, he posits that there existed no basis for a response. 
 
 We find no merit in the argument that relies on the 
Government’s certificate of non-concurrence.  That certificate 
was filed pursuant to the District Court’s Local Rules, which 
require the movant to certify that it “sought concurrence in 
the motion from each party, and that it ha[d] been either given 
or denied.”  M.D. PA. L. R. 7.1.  By filing the certificate, the 
Government met its burden.  But the Government’s filing 
cannot be construed as meeting Cruz’s burden of filing 
meaningful opposition.  This conclusion rests on both the 
District Court’s adoption and interpretation of its Local Rules.  
The District Court has made clear that a party opposing a 
motion must file an opposition brief.  See Nat’l Med. Care, 
Inc. v. Am. Renal Assocs., Inc., No. 1-702, 2002 WL 
31107534, at *5 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002); GGIS Ins. 
Servs., Inc. v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., Inc., No. 10-932, 2011 
WL 484180, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2011).  Indeed, 
Middle District Local Rule 7.6 provides the framework for 
timely-filed opposition and states that “[a]ny party who fails 
to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such 
motion.”  M.D. PA. L. R. 7.6 (emphasis added). 
 
 We similarly find no merit in Cruz’s argument that the 
District Court’s calendaring of an evidentiary hearing 
obviated the need for opposition papers.  Although the 
District Court quickly granted the Government’s scheduling 
request, the Government’s ultimate goal was clear: it sought 
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an order authorizing the BOP to forcibly medicate Cruz.  
Cruz was on notice of the Government’s ultimate request for 
relief, and he thus was or should have been aware of his 
obligation to oppose (or be deemed to support) it. 
 
 Cruz also argues that he was not obliged to present 
either evidence or argument at the Sell hearing.  In some 
sense, he is correct.  The Government bore the ultimate 
burden of proof under Sell, and Cruz was free to leave the 
Government to its proofs.  But insofar as Cruz ignored the 
local rules and chose not to present argument at the 
conclusion of the Sell hearing, he made that choice at his 
peril.  E.g. Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 
C. 
 
Notwithstanding his earlier arguments, Cruz argues 
that the Stay Brief preserved the same arguments that he now 
raises on appeal.  We disagree.  The Stay Brief was incapable 
of preserving the arguments that Cruz could have raised 
earlier but did not raise.  See Mick Haig Prods. E.K. v. Does 
1-670, 687 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012).  That conclusion 
would hold true even if the Stay Brief was treated as favoring 
both a stay and reconsideration on the merits.  See United 
States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732-33 (3d Cir. 2010).  And 
it “applies with added force” here, “where the timely raising 
of the issue would have permitted the parties to develop a 
factual record.”  Gass v. V.I. Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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V. 
 
 We now address the Sell-specific standard of review 
and the substantive arguments that Cruz advances on appeal. 
 
A. 
 
 As noted above, the first Sell criterion concerns the 
Government’s interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to 
restore his mental competency.  To justify such action, “a 
court must find that important governmental interests are at 
stake.”  Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  A court’s conclusions 
regarding the importance of the government’s interest 
necessarily involve balancing the seriousness of the crimes at 
issue with case-specific “[s]pecial circumstances” that “may 
lessen the importance of that interest.”  Id.  Examples of 
special circumstances include “the possibility that the 
defendant has already been confined for a significant amount 
of time (for which he would receive credit toward any 
sentence ultimately imposed[)]” and the likelihood, given 
“[t]he defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily,” that he 
will face “lengthy confinement in an institution for the 
mentally ill . . . that would diminish the risks that ordinarily 
attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed 
a serious crime.”  Id. 
 
 The Sell Court did not allocate burdens of proof or 
establish standards for appellate review for any of the four 
Sell criteria.  Thus, we addressed those issues for the first 
time in Grape, and we concluded that: (1) the first Sell 
criterion is a question of law subject to plenary review; (2) the 
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second, third, and fourth Sell criteria are questions of fact that 
are subject to clear error review; and (3) “the Government 
bears the burden of proof on factual questions by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  549 F.3d at 598-99.5  Our discussion 
of case-specific special circumstances in that case was limited 
both by and to the arguments raised by the parties. 
 
 Since Grape was issued, at least two other federal 
appellate courts have further refined the burdens of proof and 
standard of review that apply to the first Sell criterion.  First, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced a 
burden-shifting standard that recognizes the defendant’s 
interest in bringing special circumstances to light.  See United 
States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 699 (6th Cir. 2013) (“While 
the ultimate burden of proving an important interest . . . 
remains with the Government, . . . the defendant [must] 
demonstrate that the special circumstances of his case 
undermine the Government’s interest . . . .”).  Shortly 
thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit clarified 
the related standard of review, ruling that it would “review de 
novo the District Court’s conclusion that the Government has 
an important interest” but qualifying that “[t]o the extent that 
the District Court’s determination under the first prong of Sell 
depends on findings of fact,” it would “review those findings 
                                                 
5 Those conclusions followed the trends set by the 
majority of federal appellate courts.  When Grape was 
decided, the federal appellate courts that had reviewed the 
first Sell criterion agreed that it was a question of law subject 
to plenary review.  See Grape, 549 F.3d at 598 & n.7 
(surveying cases). 
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under a clear-error standard.”  Dillon, 738 F.3d at 291 
(citations omitted). 
 
 Insofar as the Grape court discussed the first Sell 
criterion, it had little reason to consider it as a mixed question 
of both law and fact, expound upon the related standards of 
review, or address a shifting allocation of the burdens of 
proof.  There was no dispute in that case that the defendant 
had been incarcerated for three-and-a-half years and faced 
mandatory minimum sentences of ten and fifteen years.  
Further, the facts of that case led the Court  to “decline to 
reach whether [the defendant’s] potential for indefinite civil 
confinement on the facts prior to his Harper medication 
would have sufficed under the first Sell factor to overcome 
the Government’s stated interest.”  Grape,  549 F.3d at 603 
n.10.6 
 
 We will thus adopt both the Mikulich burden-shifting 
standard and the mixed standard of review set forth in Dillon.  
Such adoption builds on the standard set forth by the Grape 
court and clarifies the extent to which defendants bear 
responsibility for proving the existence of special 
circumstances—circumstances recognized by the Supreme 
Court as inherently fact-specific.  See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 
(“Courts . . . must consider the facts of the individual case in 
evaluating the Government’s interest . . . .”). 
                                                 
6 Admittedly, the Grape court discussed the likelihood 
of civil confinement.  But given the clear statement that it 
would not reach that issue, its related commentary is best 
characterized as obiter dicta. 
 
23 
B. 
 
 Cruz earlier conceded, in the Stay Brief, that “the 
government has an interest in sentencing a convicted 
defendant.”  (Supplemental App. 9.)  Similarly, he recognizes 
on appeal that “there is a punishment interest that has some 
import.”  (Appellant Br. at 8.)  But he now raises four related 
arguments that we must address.  First, he argues that the 
Government does not and cannot have an important interest in 
restoring a defendant’s mental competency to proceed with 
sentencing.  In that sense, he distinguishes his case from 
Grape, Sell, and others where the Government’s interest arose 
pre-trial.  He next argues that the offenses for which he was 
convicted—i.e., Count II and Count III, which were each a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115—are not “serious” offenses that 
might justify the Government’s interest.  Finally, he argues 
that the District Court erred when it considered the 
importance of the Government’s interest by reference to the 
Guidelines range in the PSR and, more generally, to the PSR 
itself.7 
 
1. The Government Can Have an Important Interest 
in Restoring a Defendant’s Mental Competency 
and Rendering Him Fit to Proceed with Sentencing 
 
 In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
stated that it “appear[ed] yet unresolved whether the Sell 
                                                 
7 Certain other arguments that Cruz raises for the first 
time in the Reply Brief will not be addressed.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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principles permit the Government to involuntarily medicate a 
defendant for the purpose of rendering him competent to be 
sentenced,” noting that the Sell principles had to that point 
only been applied “where the Government’s purpose in 
medicating a defendant is to render him ‘competent to stand 
trial.’”  Baldovinos, 434 F.3d at 241 n.7 (quoting Sell, 539 
U.S. at 181).  On that basis, Cruz argues on appeal that the 
Government lacks an important interest in restoring his 
mental competency to render him fit to proceed with 
sentencing.  He seeks to distinguish this case from Grape, 
Sell, and others like it, where the Sell proceedings took place 
pre-trial. 
 
 Since Baldovinos was decided, only one court has 
considered whether the Government may have such an 
interest.8  In 2006, in United States v. Wood, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia affirmatively 
answered that question.  See Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 456-
60.  In effect, the Wood court reached the same conclusion 
                                                 
8 At oral argument, Cruz directed our attention to a 
second case, United States v. Perez-Rubalcava, No. 03-
20018, 2008 WL 4601024, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2008).  
However, because the parties in that case agreed that the 
defendant “ha[d] already been in custody for a period of time 
nearly as long as the time for which he would likely have 
been sentenced if competent,” that court did not have 
occasion to reach the questions presented here.  See id. 
(noting that the Government “ha[d] in large part obtained the 
deterrence and other goals of a criminal conviction and 
sentence”). 
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that the Government urges here: it held that the Government 
has an important interest in restoring a defendant’s mental 
competency for sentencing because it has a legitimate interest 
in punishing those who have committed crimes.  See id. at 
458 (“[T]he sentence a defendant receives should accurately 
reflect the real nature of his offense, and should be tailored to 
the defendant’s circumstances.”); id. at 459 (“[T]here is a 
very important, legislatively articulated, governmental 
interest in achieving fair, reasonable and non-disparate 
sentences for similarly situated defendants who have engaged 
in similar conduct.”). 
 
 The Wood court’s holding rests on its analysis of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the Sentencing Act”), the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005), where the Supreme Court discussed 
governmental sentencing interests.  See id. at 458-59.  It 
found in pertinent part that Booker “made clear that the 
Government has an important interest in enforcing” both the 
Sentencing Act and Sentencing Guidelines.  Id.  It thus 
concluded that the Government has an important interest in 
“[r]easonable, constitutionally acceptable measures that help 
achieve that interest,” including, importantly, “[t]he forcible 
administration of medication to restore competence for 
sentencing.”  Id. at 459. 
 
 Although the Wood court’s decision does not bind this 
Court, its reasoning is highly persuasive.  As that court 
recognized, in Booker the Supreme Court highlighted 
governmental interests that are inherent in sentencing 
proceedings.  It repeatedly emphasized that the sentencing 
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scheme put in place by the Sentencing Act and Sentencing 
Guidelines “diminishes sentencing disparity” and “move[s] 
the sentencing system in the direction of increased 
uniformity.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 250, 253.  It also repeatedly 
emphasized that sentencing uniformity depends in critical part 
on the relationship between punishment and “the real conduct 
that underlies the crime of conviction.”  Id. at 250; see id. at 
251 (“Judges have long looked to real conduct when 
sentencing,” and often rely on “a presentence report, prepared 
by a probation officer, for information (often unavailable until 
after the trial) relevant to the manner in which the convicted 
offender committed the crime of conviction.”); id. at 253-54 
(“[I]ncreased uniformity . . . does not consist simply of 
similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same 
statute . . . .  It consists, more importantly, of similar 
relationships between sentences and real conduct, 
relationships that Congress’ [sic] sentencing statues helped to 
advance[.]”). 
 
 The Government cannot achieve the sort of uniformity 
contemplated in Booker without formal sentencing 
proceedings.  A criminal defendant enjoys the right to 
allocute at sentencing, and he also enjoys the right to object to 
the PSR, to argue for favorable sentencing variances and 
downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, and to 
oppose any arguments favoring upward variances or 
departures from the Guidelines.  Those rights, which to a 
great degree reflect the defendant’s “real conduct,” id. at 250, 
necessarily require the defendant to both actively participate 
in sentencing proceedings and inform his attorney’s actions.  
Because an incompetent defendant is presumed unable to take 
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those actions, the Government maintains an important interest 
in restoring his mental competency and enabling him to do so. 
 
 Cruz here raises two arguments that the Wood court 
appears not to have had occasion to address.  First, he argues 
that the Government’s interest in forcibly medicating him to 
restore his competency for sentencing is undercut by its 
ability to seek a provisional sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4244, 
whereby “in lieu of being sentenced to imprisonment” he 
would “be committed to a suitable facility for care and 
treatment” until he either “recovered from his mental disease 
or defect” or had been confined for “the maximum term 
authorized by law for the offense for which [he] was found 
guilty.”  18 U.S.C. § 4244(d), (e).  He also argues that the 
Government’s interest in restoring his competency for 
sentencing is less than the interest recognized in Sell, 
contending that the Supreme Court placed particular emphasis 
on the pre-trial nature of the proceedings when it announced 
that “it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who 
regains competence after years of commitment during which 
memories may fade or evidence may be lost.”  Sell, 539 U.S. 
at 180.  But neither argument carries significant weight.  Cruz 
would have this Court parse sentencing proceedings from the 
substantive trial proceedings to which they are inexorably 
linked.  This Court, like the Wood court, will reject that 
invitation.  “If the sentencing phase of a federal criminal 
prosecution is not quite a ‘tail which wags the dog of the 
substantive offense,’ McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 
88[] (1986), it is nonetheless a critical step in the criminal 
justice process that Congress designed.”  Wood, 459 F. Supp. 
2d at 459. 
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 Insofar as Cruz argues that provisional sentencing 
under § 4244 undermines the Government’s important 
interest in restoring his competency for sentencing, he 
appears to ignore important language from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Sell.  There, the Supreme Court noted that 
the possibility of civil confinement “affects, but does not 
totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution.”  
539 U.S. at 180 (emphasis added).  And it appears axiomatic 
that sentencing is an integral part of prosecution: 
 
 When people speak of prosecutions, they 
usually mean a proceeding that is under way in 
which guilt is to be determined.  In ordinary 
usage, sentencing is not part of the prosecution, 
but occurs after the prosecution has concluded. . 
. [However, r]ather than using terms in their 
everyday sense, (t)he law uses familiar legal 
terms in their familiar legal sense.  The term 
‘prosecution’ clearly imports a beginning and 
an end. 
 . . . Final judgment in a criminal case 
means sentence.  The sentence is the judgment.  
In the legal sense, a prosecution terminates only 
when sentence is imposed. 
  
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 608 (1973) (defining 
“prosecution” within meaning ascribed by savings clause of 
Section 1103(a) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
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Prevention and Control Act of 1970).9  Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine prosecution without sentencing.  Such a scheme 
would turn criminal convictions into little more than paper 
tigers.  See United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (Noonan, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“To 
deny that the sentencing process is part of a criminal 
prosecution is to cut out the guts of criminal prosecution as it 
is conducted in our courts.”). 
 
 Furthermore, insofar as Cruz argues that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Sell should be limited to the proceedings in 
                                                 
9 Several cases support this conclusion.  See Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (concluding in context 
of Sixth Amendment that “sentencing is a critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings at which [a defendant] is entitled to the 
effective assistance of counsel”); Bradley, 410 U.S. at 611 
(“As we have said, sentencing is part of the prosecution.”); 
United States v. Thompson, 713 F.3d 388, 394 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding in First Amendment context that “[s]entencing may . 
. . be viewed as within the scope of the criminal trial itself” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 171, 175 
(2d Cir. 2003) (“[S]entencing is an integral part of 
‘prosecution’ of the accused, as that term is used in” the 
General Saving Statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109”); United States v. 
Wells, 154 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) (in affirming 
conviction for obstruction of justice, stating unequivocally 
that “sentencing is part of the prosecution”); United States v. 
Green, 680 F.2d 183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting on other grounds) (“Sentencing is the most 
important part of the typical criminal trial.”). 
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which a defendant’s guilt may be determined, he ignores 
important procedural aspects of the sentencing phase of trial.  
As noted above, the Supreme Court stated its concern in Sell 
that “memories may fade or evidence may be lost.”  539 U.S. 
at 180.  That concern applies with equal force to both the 
jury’s determination of a defendant’s guilt and the court’s 
sentencing determinations.  Whereas the Court announced in 
Sell that “it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant 
who regains competence after years of commitment during 
which memories may fade and evidence may be lost,” id. 
(emphasis added), we recognize that it may be difficult or 
impossible to sentence a defendant who regains competence 
after years of commitment for substantially the same reasons.  
Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 251 (noting that “judges have long 
relied upon a presentence report . . . for information (often 
unavailable until after the trial)” for sentencing purposes). 
 
2. The Offenses at Issue Were “Serious” and They 
Thus Justified the Government’s Interest 
 
 Cruz next argues that the crimes for which he was 
convicted—Count II and Count III, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 
115—were not as serious as the crimes at issue in Sell and 
Grape, and he appears to contend that the seriousness of his 
crimes undermines the Government’s interest in restoring his 
competency for sentencing.  The seriousness of a defendant’s 
crimes is, of course, the yardstick against which the court will 
measure the governmental interests that are at stake.  And 
serious crimes may be committed against either persons or 
property because “[i]n both instances the Government seeks 
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to protect through application of the criminal law the basic 
need for human security.”  539 U.S. at 180. 
 
 Because this Court has not yet promulgated a test to 
determine the seriousness of a crime, the District Court 
gauged the seriousness of Cruz’s crimes by reference to both 
the statutory maximum sentence associated with those 
offenses and the likely Guidelines range that was set forth in 
the PSR.  It concluded that, under either rubric, his crimes 
were serious.  We agree, and, as in Grape, need not decide 
here whether the seriousness of an offense should be 
measured against either the statutory maximum associated 
with an offense or the likely Guidelines range. 
 
 Cruz has not argued by reference to the applicable 
statutory maximum that his crimes are not serious.  Indeed, it 
appears that he cannot.  At least two other federal appellate 
courts have determined that the offense at issue here, a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115, is a serious crime because it 
carries a maximum sentence of ten years.  See United States 
v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 301, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115 is a serious 
crime “under any reasonable standard”). 
 
 His argument on the seriousness of his crimes as 
gauged by the Guidelines range in the PSR is similarly 
unavailing.  In United States v. Gillenwater, the defendant 
was charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875 (transmitting 
threatening interstate communications) and 876 (transmitting 
threatening communications by mail), and the “likely 
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Guidelines range [w]as 33 to 41 months.”  749 F.3d 1094, 
1101 (9th Cir. 2014).  That Guidelines range is less than that 
at issue here.10  Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
considered the likely Guidelines range and concluded that the 
charged offenses were “serious enough to establish an 
important governmental interest in [the defendant’s] 
prosecution.”  Id.  She noted that the defendant stood 
“accused of making lurid and distressing threats against a 
bevy of government officials and employees” and she thus 
reasoned that through prosecution the Government sought 
“‘to protect through application of the criminal law the basic 
human need for security’ . . . [and] the very integrity of our 
system of government.”  Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180). 
                                                 
10 Cruz takes issue with the likely Guidelines range 
that was presented in the PSR, which was premised on a 
career offender enhancement.  It appears, however, that the 
legal arguments relating to that issue are foreclosed by our 
recent decision in United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389 
(2014). 
In any event, the Guidelines range urged by Cruz—
i.e., 51 to 63 months—is still greater than that at issue in 
Gillenwater.  It is thus a difference without distinction.  Even 
if we accepted the Guidelines range urged by Cruz, then we 
would conclude that the crimes at issue are serious.  See 
Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101 (concluding that threats of 
violence, directed against federal officials, were serious 
where likely Guidelines range called for only thirty three to 
forty-one months’ imprisonment). 
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 The crimes at issue here are no less “lurid and 
distressing” than those at issue in Gillenwater.  There, the 
defendant was charged with sending violent and graphically 
descriptive threats to officials from the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration and the Department of Labor.  See 
id. at 1097-98.  Here, Cruz repeatedly threatened officials 
from the SSA and Federal Protective Service (“FPS”).  He 
yelled at several SSA officials that they were “going to need 
toe tags” and told an FPS official that he would “take [his] 
ticket book, take [his] gun, take [his] doughnut and beat [his] 
ass.”  In another, particularly graphic encounter with an FPS 
official, he stated that “[t]here [sic] gonna be a war about 
this,” explaining that you should be concerned about yourself. 
. . .  If I’m gonna tell you I’m gonna kill you, I ain’t gonna 
tell you I’m gonna kill you, I’m gonna swing at you, all I 
gotta do is hit you one time,” and inviting the official to 
“come see me in person so we can talk and see whatever, so I 
can see what I’m talking to.  Give me a target, you have one.”  
United States v. Cruz, No. 11-242, 2012 WL 3027809, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. July 24, 2012) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 Those statements demonstrate the reasonableness of 
concluding that the Government’s interest in preserving 
“human security” is as great here as it was in both Sell and 
Gillenwater.  See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (recognizing the 
Government’s need “to protect through application of the 
criminal law the basic human need for security”); 
Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing the Government’s 
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need “to protect the very integrity of our system of 
government”).11 
 
3. As a General Matter, the District Court Did Not 
Commit Reversible Plain Error When it 
Considered and Relied on the PSR 
 
 Cruz next argues that the District Court erred when it 
considered the Guidelines range appearing in the PSR 
                                                 
11 In any event, the District Court’s consideration of 
the seriousness of Cruz’s offenses by reference to the likely 
Guidelines range cannot constitute plain error.  As noted 
above, we have yet to decide whether the seriousness of an 
offense should be measured against mandatory minimum 
sentences or likely Guidelines ranges.  Other circuit courts are 
split on that issue.  See Grape, 549 F.3d at 600; see also 
Dillon, 738 F.3d at 292 (recognizing the circuit split as 
recently as December of 2013).  Under those circumstances, 
there could be no plain error.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Keller, 666 F.3d 103, 109 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Furthermore, the error that Cruz would have us assign 
could not have affected his substantial rights.  Although the 
District Court concluded that Cruz’s crimes were serious by 
reference to the likely Guidelines range, it reached the same 
conclusion upon its separate and alternative analysis of the 
mandatory maximum sentence associated with his crimes.  
Because it consideration of the likely Guidelines range 
ultimately did not affect the outcome of his Sell proceeding, 
Cruz was not and could not be prejudiced by it.  See United 
States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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because that range did not account for Cruz’s mental health 
status, which could potentially serve as a basis for a 
downward departure or variance.  However, because Cruz 
raises this argument for the first time in the Reply Brief, we 
will not consider it.  Instead, we will deem it, like the other 
arguments that were raised for the first time in the Reply 
Brief, to be waived.  See Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 222. 
 
C. 
 
 Lastly, Cruz argues that the District Court erred when 
it concluded that the Government’s interest was not 
undermined by the likelihood that Cruz will be civilly 
committed in the future.  As discussed above, that 
circumstance involves a fact-specific inquiry, and , 
accordingly, this Court should review the District Court’s 
related legal conclusions de novo and its factfinding for clear 
error.  See Dillon, 738 F.3d at 291. 
 The District Court considered the likelihood that Cruz 
would be civilly committed in the future under both federal 
and state civil commitment statutes and concluded that it was, 
at best, unclear.  (See App. 9-10.)  In pertinent part, it 
explained: 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d), the court would 
need to find that Cruz is suffering from a mental 
disease or defect that would create “a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person or serious damage to property of 
another” if released.  Similarly, the state civil 
commitment statute, 50 [Pa.C.S.] § 7301, 
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provides for involuntary emergency 
examination and treatment of people who are 
“severely mentally disabled and in need of 
immediate treatment.”  Under the statute, a 
person is severely mentally disabled when, as a 
result of mental illness, “he poses a clear and 
present danger of harm to others or to himself.”  
50 [Pa.C.S.] § 7301(a).  A “clear and present 
danger of harm” to others may be 
“demonstrated by proof that the person has 
made threats of harm and has committed acts in 
furtherance of the threat to commit harm.”  50 
[Pa.C.S.] § 7301(b). 
 The May 2013 evaluation explicitly 
states that Cruz has not posed a threat to himself 
or others while housed at FMC-Butner and does 
not pose a risk of committing serious harm to 
others.  Cruz was convicted of two counts of 
threatening federal law enforcement officers, 
but there is no indication that he committed 
explicit acts in furtherance of those threats.  On 
the other hand, the pre-sentence investigation 
report  indicates that Cruz has a lengthy 
criminal history involving numerous acts of 
violence and threats of violence and an 
extensive history of mental health treatment, 
including involuntary commitments.  Entries 
from the [BOP’s] Psychology Data System, 
dated June 20, 2013 to October 10, 2013, 
indicate that Cruz has continued to threaten 
violence against others.  Several entries indicate 
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that the potential for Cruz to cause harm to 
others is moderate or high. 
 
(Id.)  On those facts, it concluded that “[u]ncertainty 
surrounding the issue of whether Cruz is likely to be civilly 
committed does not materially diminish, and it clearly does 
not undermine, the government’s interest in sentencing Cruz.”  
(App. 10.) 
 
 Following close review of the record, we will not 
disturb the District Court’s factfinding because it is not 
clearly erroneous.  Its recitation of the facts, including those 
related to the May 2013 evaluation, Cruz’s history of mental 
health issues, and his history of violence and threats of 
violence, is well-supported by the record.  Thus, we find no 
error in the District Court’s conclusion that it was uncertain 
whether Cruz would in the future meet the factual 
prerequisites for civil commitment under either 18 U.S.C. § 
4246 or 50 Pa.C.S. § 4244.  The stark contrast between the 
May 2013 evaluation and Cruz’s history of both threats of 
violence and actual violence fairly led the District Court to 
reach that conclusion.  Further, we find no plain error in the 
District Court’s conclusion that such uncertainty neither 
materially diminished or undermined the Government’s 
interest in restoring his competency for sentencing.  Cf. 
Mikulich, 732 F.3d at 697. 
 
 Furthermore, under plain error review, Cruz has failed 
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged error in 
either the District Court’s factfinding or ultimate conclusion 
that uncertainty surrounded the likelihood of future civil 
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commitment.  Although eligibility for civil commitment may 
“diminish[] the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without 
punishment one who has committed a serious crime,” Sell, 
539 U.S. at 180, and thereby lessen the Government’s interest 
in restoring Cruz’s competency, see Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 
1101, the uncertainty found by the District Court here would 
undoubtedly reduce the amount by which this circumstance 
would lessen the Government’s interest. 
 
VI. 
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the order 
entered by the District Court pursuant to Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166 (2003) on October 24, 2013. 
